

dort bis zur französischen Küste 47 Grad 30 Minuten Nord 2 Grad 40 Minuten West.

Die bei Erklärung der totalen deutschen Blockade um England am 17. August 1940 an die neutrale Schifffahrt ergangene Warnung, daß jedes Schiff, welches sich trotz dieser Warnung in das deutsche Operationsgebiet um England begibt, sich der Gefahr der Vernichtung aussetzt und daß für Schäden, die sich hieraus ergeben, von Deutschland keine Verantwortung übernommen werden kann, gilt nunmehr für das erweiterte Operationsgebiet.

Notenwechsel zwischen dem Staatssekretär der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und dem britischen Botschafter in Washington über die britische Flotte

Schreiben des Staatssekretärs Cordell Hull vom 29. August 1940¹⁾

The Prime Minister of Great Britain is reported to have stated on June 4, 1940, to Parliament in effect that if during the course of the present war in which Great Britain and the British Commonwealth are engaged the waters surrounding the British Isles should become untenable for British ships of war, the British Fleet would in no event be surrendered or sunk but would be sent overseas for the defense of other parts of the Empire.

The Government of the United States would respectfully inquire whether the foregoing statement represents the settled policy of the British Government.

C. H.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, August 29, 1940.

Schreiben des Botschafters Lord Lothian vom 2. September 1940¹⁾

In his *Aide-Memoire* of August 29th, 1940, the Secretary of State enquired whether the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament on June 4th, 1940, regarding the intention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom never to surrender or sink the British Fleet in the event of the waters surrounding the British Isles becoming untenable for His Majesty's Ships 'represents the settled policy of His Majesty's Government'.

His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed by the Prime Minister to inform Mr. Secretary Hull that this statement certainly does represent the settled policy of His Majesty's Government. Mr. Churchill must however observe that these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern the German fleet or what is left of it than the British Fleet.

L.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

September 2nd, 1940.

¹⁾ The Department of State Bulletin Vol. III: No. 63, p. 195.